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| [5] Paris Peace Convention |
After four years of fighting alongside the Central Powers to defeat the Allies, Germany was made to end their war in a peace that threatened their growth and identity as a nation. The Allied Nations of World War I crippled German forces to the point that the Germans could no longer see any chance for victory. They asked for an end to the fighting and an armistice was signed on November 11, 1918.[1] However, it would take six more months for peace to be negotiated. The Allies met at the Paris Peace Convention to draw up terms for a series of treaties with the Central Powers, thus named the Paris Peace Treaties. Here, the Treaty of Versailles was created specifically for Germany.
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| [6] What We Will Lose! (Louis Oppenheim, 1919) |
The terms of the Treaty of Versailles were greater than what the German people were expecting and was almost “universally opposed.” As Schulze writes, “the amount of territory Germany was to lose exceeded the most pessimistic predictions; the requirements for demilitarization would leave an army that looked more like a police force and render Germany incapable of defending itself.”[2] Also, Germany would be made to pay reparations to the Allied nations of about 31.4 billion marks at the time. In fact, the last reparation payments were made on October 4, 2010.[3] A propaganda poster, created by Louis Oppenheim, depicts what Germany would stand to lose if the Treaty of Versailles was accepted: “20 percent of its territory, 10 percent of the population, one-third of its hard coal production, four-fifths of its iron reserves, and all its colonies and commercial fleet.”2 Additionally, the treaty called for Germany to take responsibility for starting the war in the first place.
No one wanted the treaty to be signed and the prime minister, Philipp Scheidemann, publicly refused to sign it unless more favorable terms could be negotiated. However, the Allies were in no mood to relinquish their demands and they pressured the German National Assembly to accept the treaty by blockading the country of food and supplies. Also, the Allies held the treat of resuming hostilities by continuing to fight that the Germans could not ignore. They no longer had to ability to continue and allowing themselves to be dragged back into the fight at this point would only prolong the suffering for a little while, since they had little to no resources left.
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| [7] Hall of Mirrors |
The Treaty of Versailles was signed on June 28, 1919; five years to the day after Archduke Franz Ferdinand’s assassination triggered the start of the war.1 It was signed in the Hall of Mirrors in the palace of King Louis XIV. The location was significant in that this was the room in which the German Empire was founded and William I was declared Kaiser about fifty years earlier.[4] While the Allies may have believed that they were justly punishing Germany for what it had done and taking away what little resources it had left in order to prevent the country from causing more trouble, Germans viewed the treaty as “unjust terms being forced on a defenseless country.”4 Furthermore, the treaty embodied “an arbitrary instrument of Western might” that Germans associated with the democratic form of government. From this, they were turned off by democracy and their own Weimar Republic. The stage was set for a new German leadership that Adolf Hitler would be able to take advantage of over the next few decades. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, understood the sentiments of the German people and what they could lead to. He proclaimed, “When nations are exhausted by wars… which leave them tired, bleeding, and broken, it is not difficult to patch up a peace… What is difficult, however, is to draw up a peace which will not provoke a fresh struggle when those who have had practical experience of what war means have passed away.”4 George had the foresight to understand what the Treaty of Versailles might mean for the future, but it was only one factor in a perfect storm that would open the door for World War II.


